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Abstract
Transaction costs are among the most important explanatory variables for institutional
economics. Starting from Ronald Coase as the pioneer then North, Wallis, Williamson
and many other economists have been pointing to this. Institutional quality can be
measured by the rule of law index and government effectiveness; however, the im-
pacts on the economy as spillover effects are the other crucial points which needed
to be studied. Besides these, how are these transaction costs created? What kind of
sources are they coming from? In order to explain these questions, understanding insti-
tutional change is vital. Yet, this may not be enough to explain where this institutional
change is coming from. Are countries experiencing modernization and if so, how? Do
countries affect each other so that they are becoming similar? What is the cost of this
unity? How will this unity be achieved by these countries? To answer these additional
questions, one should start from international trade. The neoclassical international
trade theory suggests that countries converge on each other as they trade goods and
services. Also, as trade volume increases, we expect to have more consumption and
production and some other benefits which lead to an increase in the utility level of
representative households. The rate of convergence depends on countries’ bargaining
power. Therefore, countries force their trade partners to cause institutional changes.
According to the Walrasian world, transaction costs are assumed to be zero since we
have perfect markets. However, in the real world we have uncertainty, and information
is not costless. Thus, people encounter these transaction costs as stated by Coase and
many others. All in all, considering trade, institutional change and transaction costs
together will provide the net benefits from trade. As evidenced by Japan, the path
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of institutional change is coming from Western influences. These influences started
in Japan increasing the international trade volume in the Meiji Era. Consequently, the
main purpose of this dissertation is to bring together all the crucial points stated above,
and then find the net gains from trade. This unique idea fills the gap in the literature.
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Chapter 1
Introduction and Research Question
1.1 Introduction
Trade is one of the most important sections in the national economy. Simply put, GDP includes
consumption, investment, government expenditure and net exports. From this perspective, the
importance of trade is obvious. According to the neoclassical world, countries trade goods and
services in order to produce more, consume more, have lower prices, obtain higher quality prod-
ucts and have different products. Samuelson, Bhagwati and many other economists suggest that
free trade is better than no trade, or at least some trade is better than no trade. From this per-
spective, we expect to have an increase in our utility level as we trade more and more. However,
in the literature, something is missing. Bargaining power should be considered. Do all countries
get the same benefits from trade? Or is this calculation efficient? To answer these questions, this
dissertation aims to show net benefits from trade with all sides such as gains and costs. In a simple
exchange process, partners influence each other, and this influence is unavoidable. From this point,
countries influence each other before, during and after trade as well. Depending on their political
and economic power, these gains from trade will not be distributed evenly among partners. In this
case, institutional change is playing the crucial role. Neoclassical theory suggests that countries
converge as they trade. Therefore, trading partners force each other to change their institutions.
To trade with partners, countries would have to change their institutions from informal/traditional
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situations to formal situations. In this dissertation, change in institutions and how institutional
qualities are affected will not be studied. This is outside of the scope. However, change in insti-
tutions is not costless. Countries would have some costs as a result of institutional changes which
are called transaction costs. According to North (1990), transaction costs are the most important
dimensions for institutions. Therefore, once institutions are considered, one should measure their
quantitative impacts on the economy as transaction costs. To sum up, when trade, convergence and
institutional changes are considered together, the net gains from trade will be different from how
they are calculated so far. This is the focus of this dissertation: to have net welfare analysis for
representative households from trade, considering institutional changes and their impacts.
1.2 International Trade
Carbaugh (2011) states that the importance of international trade is coming from history. Starting
from Mercantilists, then followed by classical economists - Adam Smith, David Ricardo, and John
Stuart Mill, the trade theory has been improving till now. According to mercantilists, the world
has a fixed wealth so that if one nation gets benefits from trade then the other trading partner
losses. This is the static view of trade. However, according to Adam Smith (1776), the world is not
static, but dynamic, so that when countries trade with each other with specialization and division
of labor, then world welfare will increase. David Ricardo (1817) modifies Adam Smith’s ideas
and concludes that after trade world output increases, consumption will increase. This is the trade
theory which is coming from the past to the present, as always with improvements.
1.2.1 Summary of International Trade Theory
Being rational people, we aim to reach the two most important cases: profit maximization and/or
cost minimization – as producers and utility (benefit) maximization – and/or cost minimization
as consumers given limited sources. Meade (1966) states the marginal conditions for Utopian
Efficiency to explain that economic resources including land, labor, capital and adding one more,
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which is technology, should be used efficiently when it is impossible to make one citizen better off
without making any other citizens worse off. In order to briefly look at these conditions which are
given by him:





• Population and saving optimization.
According to him, these conditions are necessary for economic welfare. In order to reach the effi-
cient economic welfare, marginal adjustments play critical roles. In his book, he tries to minimize
or eliminate the differences between marginal social values and costs. From his point of view, one
may still change the economic welfare even by having these necessary conditions through struc-
tural economic change, which is discussed in the section 1.3.
When we ask why nations would like to trade, the answer is obvious. Countries have both absolute
and comparative advantages according to Adam Smith and David Ricardo. Briefly summarizing
the absolute advantage, Adam Smith (1776) suggests that countries should produce and export the
goods in which they have the absolute advantage -lower cost- hence becoming more competitive
than their trading partners. David Ricardo (1817) modifies this theory that countries should spe-
cialize in the production and export of goods even though they do not have absolute advantage but
having a comparative advantage -lowest opportunity cost, therefore being more competitive than
their trading partners for the goods which have the lowest opportunity cost.
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1.2.2 Types of Gains From Trade
In this section, types of gains from trade will be discussed from the international trade theory start-
ing with mercantilists. This plays one of the critical roles in this work. Gains from trade should be
for every single nation. Because of trade, even though world output and consumption will increase
according to D. Ricardo, individual nations should be taken care of depending on their bargaining
powers, trade unions, institutional changes, etc. In this work, mainly institutional changes will be
stressed as the result of trade with countries and their bargaining power. Bhagwati, Panagariya, and
Srinivasan (1998) point out the basic theorem of gains from trade. According to them, if one counts
price, then free trade is better than no trade, but if one does not take prices, then some trade is
better than no trade. In the second case, they take care of utility changes before and after trade and
suggest that we need to make someone better off without making anybody worse off. This sticks
with the Utopian Efficiency by J. Meade. In this work, depending on the data availability, which is
discussed in chapter 3, trade volume and average consumption expenditure/change in consumption
expenditure, will be calculated for selected years in Japan as a whole country and as being from
different representative households. In literature, we have important types of gains from trade as
follows;





• Varieties in Production.
As stated above, in this work, to measure welfare gains from international trade -in the view of
institutional change and its impacts as transaction costs- consumption gains will be studied as well
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as how people’s consumption expenditure is changing because of changes in trade volume in Japan.
Methodology is discussed in chapter 3.
1.3 Institutions
The role of institutions in economic performance has been gaining importance for the last half
century. The work of Coase, Hurwicz, North, and many others is noting this importance. Hurwicz
(1996) states that institutions are humanly devised constraints which shape human interaction. It
includes rules plus regularities. North (1990) also stresses Hurwicz’s definitions and concludes
that institutions create political, economic and social incentives. As stated by Hurwicz for insti-
tutions as constraints, it would be both formal and informal constraints. North points out that
starting from early history, without having institutions and organizations, the informal constraints
-including taboos, rituals, and behaviors- were important, and formal constraints -such as rules and
regulations- are acquiring importance after institutional frameworks were built up. According to
him, institutional frameworks include legal rules, organizational forms, enforcement and norms of
behavior. Thus, this framework creates the structure for the exchange.
1.3.1 Historical Way of Institutional Change
The path of institutional change provides a convergency between countries as they trade. Ac-
cording to neoclassical international trade theory, North (1990) states that countries will gradually
converge as they trade goods and services. This convergence will happen between any type of
countries, especially between developed and developing countries. This institutional change hap-
pens overnight as a formal change, and takes time as an informal change due to the change in
cultures, traditions, norms, taboos, etc. The informal change shows the historical path of insti-
tutional change. North also shows the difference between personal and impersonal exchanges in
terms of costs. In the personal exchange, transaction costs are low because of cultural homogene-
ity and the lack of third party enforcement, whereas in the impersonal exchange, transaction costs
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are high since both parties are constrained by some rules, and third-party enforcement captures
some gains as transaction costs. As stated above, since transaction costs are the most observable
dimensions of institutions and institutional change, having institutional frameworks would capture
gains from trade or exchange by contract enforcement, property rights, and court costs. These are
discussed thoroughly in the next section.
1.3.2 Institutional Change in Japan
In this section, institutional change in Japan is discussed in view of both the historical perspective,
particularly the Meiji Era, and the recent period.
Meiji Era (1868-1912)
Starting from 1850s -the end of Tokugawa period- international trade and its results as being the
Western influence had been increasing. International trade in Japan started during the period that
shows the relationship between Japan and the rest of the world. However, in this dissertation, the
historical data was taken from 1880 to get the most balanced data set between variables.
Lockwood (1968) states that the decay of feudalism started from the Meiji Era in the form of
changes in business class and political power to representatives of people. In Henshall’s (1999)
book he talks about unequal treaties and about trade during the last decades of the Tokugawa pe-
riod and the early Meiji Era which resulted in losing control of trade by the Japanese. Therefore,
Western influence on Japan was then historically started and proven.
Changes in institutions in Japan in the classical period was inevitable because of Western influ-
ence. Japan as a country has had several key changes in not only economic life but also in social
life including1;
• Restriction on property rights was abolished.
1Source: Lockwood (1968)
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• New fiscal systems were created.
• Banks and insurance were created.
• Service sectors were created.
• There was an improvement of manufactured sectors.
These are some of the major changes during those years in Japan. Economically, they seemed to
create efficiency and growth; however, they caused the creation of transaction costs for the entire
economy and society which needs to be considered deeply.
Vital Changes in Meiji Framework (1868-1912)2
It can be seen below that convergency to the Western Style happened both in governmental orga-
nizations and the economic society.
By foreigners -mainly by British people.
Influences on Change in Service Activities
Improvements in Science and Technology Import Requirements
Change in Political Institutions Shipping
Change in Economic Organizations Banking
Increase in number of Foreign Experts Commercial Services
Increase in number of Foreign Merchants Property Rights
Henshall also states the convergency in society as the following:
• Telegraph started operating in 1869.
• Postal service in 1871.
2By Lockwood(1968)
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• Western dress became fashionable, and in 1872 became required for some government em-
ployees.
• Western style haircut became fashionable.
• Western Solar Gregorian calendar was adopted in 1873.
These are the most significant ones among all changes. In addition to the above changes, Yoo and
Steckel (2016) point out the importance of having property rights in the Meiji Era. Property rights
provided people not only the title of their land but also the use of it. Yet, there was a registration
process and its costs for having the title in hand. People started to pay these kinds of fees during
that era, therefore transaction costs were created and grew over time.
During the Meiji Era, besides these changes in all society, there were also wars between Japan-Sino
(1894-95) and Japan-Russo (1904-05). Canals (2015), writes these wars were important sources
of higher economic growth. Even though there was westernization and improvements in industry
in Japan, defense/war spending seemed to be another significant factor for economic growth.
Timetable of Major Developments in the Meiji Era:3
• Economy and society were westernized by western advisers’ help in early 1870s.
• First railroad was built in 1870-72 by the small aid from British Loan, then improvements
took place.
• Foreign trade increased significantly after 1868.
• Privatization by the government in early 1880s.
• Significant improvement in early 1890s.
• Sino-Japanese war-Japanese victories in 1894-95.
3Henshall (1999)
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• Anglo-Japanese alliance in 1902.
• Russo-Japanese war-Japanese victories in 1904-1905.
• Japan annexes Korea in 1910.
To sum up, this dissertation does not aim to show how the western world influenced the Japanese
economy and society; instead, it particularly exhibits how and where these transaction costs have
been coming from. Starting from the end of the Tokugawa period and the Meiji Era, international
trade volume increased as well as western influence. This can be seen in the last chapter of this
study. These two main factors played a critical role in changes in institutions which caused higher
transaction costs for the Japanese economy. However, the qualitative impact of changes in institu-
tions is not discussed in this study. On the one hand, the economy has an increase in transaction
costs as a quantitative impact. On the other hand, the economy easily integrates with the rest of the
world which is out of scope for this dissertation.
Corporate Governance Perspective
Aoki (2000) simply defines the corporate governance in Japan as "the structure of rights and re-
sponsibilities among parties with a stake in the firm." He also points out the significant relationship
between the corporate governance and financial and employment systems. Moreover, he states that
the Japanese workers were the lifetime employees of a company, then they could become the com-
pany’s stakeholders. In the corporate governance in the Anglo-American system, employees are
simply outsiders. The main goal of this dissertation is not to explain what the corporate gover-
nance is in Japan, and the USA, however, its importance has a key role in institutional diversity
and universality.
From the historical perspective to the modern period, the importance of institutions has been in-
creasing. Field (1979) describes this importance as explaining the equilibrium of game in economy,
therefore both institutions and technology need to be considered together. He also defines the in-
stitutions in any game model as being humanly devised rules in the form of implicit or explicit.
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Therefore, historical as in the Meiji Era, and comparative as in the corporate governance structure,
need to be complementary according to Greif (1998). He examines the historical and compara-
tive institutional analysis and concludes that history is a key factor in explaining institutions in the
way of emerging and evolving. Moreover, institutions are comparative in the way of attempting to
gain insights, and finally, as in this dissertation and many other studies, institutions have analytic
frameworks which provide empirical work opportunities. Greif also defines the institutions as non-
technological constraints which shape economy and society. Apart from the above explanations
and definitions, in Japan, institutions were created as a result of Western influence starting with
international trade, and the costs of transaction emerged and evolved over time.
In the case of Japan after the Second World War, the banking system was working perfectly till
1975 according to Aoki. Then he explains the failure of bureaupluralism -which means Japanese
workers are lifetime employees and shareholders of companies- during the 1980s to adopt the new
global and technological environment. This not only caused additional institutional change and
increases in transaction costs, but it also might have caused the generating of the bubble. In 1997,
the Asian crisis first hit the four Asian countries, then it hit Japan’s banking and financial system.
This crisis is not the scope of this dissertation, however, because of it, the Anglo-American system
was applied, and Aoki asks if this system works efficiently.
The neoclassical economics considers institutions as a substitute for the market maximizing of ef-
ficiency. However, many examples show the opposite according to Aoki. In his book (1999), he
states how institutions, as in the property rights case, create the transaction costs. In addition to
this, the Walrasian world says transaction costs are assumed to be zero. However, this is not the
case since, as explained in the section 1.4, we have transaction costs during the exchange process
which captures the gains. Aoki argues that if there is an increase in trade opportunities, improve-
ment in technology and growth in population provide new insights to calculate the gains from
exchanges. From his perspective, this dissertation aims to recalculate the gains from international
trade as adding transaction costs to the equation. As explained above, the trigger factor of change
in institutions is coming from international trade or exogenously given by the strong trade partner
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as forcing the other partner to change its political and economic institutions, plus converging its
society. Thus, the creation of transaction costs, as in the registration costs, has been emerging
endogenously.
Furthermore, Aoki shows the weak points for unity of institutions across the world. He argues for
the Comparative Institutional Analysis (CIA thereafter) as having a diversity in institutions which
will provide benefits for countries. In other words, the gains from a basic exchange are not the
net ones because an optimal organizational diversity in the trade partners needs to be determined,
according to him. Aoki (1995) exhibits the path dependent organizational relation between the US
and Japan during the last 50-60 years, which seems to prove the arguments above. He provides
examples to clarify his arguments that in the micro-level firms try to find new and better ways to
produce their products, and since each firm is unique, they can find unique ways. After that, those
methods may be transferred to other firms. He also adds the importance of having an organiza-
tional diversity between the US, Japan, and China as in the Asia Pacific region, which provides the
gains from free trade. However, the above examples are beyond this dissertation’s purpose. They
are only referenced to show the significance of having an organizational diversity or, in general,
the diversity of institutions to understand and realize the gains from trade.
1.3.3 Impacts on Economy
Institutions have an impact on the economy by structuring the exchange and production, hence
transaction costs start to play the most important role in this exchange according to North. Transac-
tion costs are both measurable/observable as well as non-observable costs in the economy. Because
of this fact, in literature, mainly qualitative measurements of institutions are playing roles. How-
ever, in this paper, the quantitative measurement of institutions will be calculated. As economists
above state, the impact of institutions on the economy are causing increases in transaction costs.




Transaction costs are among most important in explaining institutions and institutional change.
North and Wallis (1986) are the pioneers of calculating transaction costs in an economy in the
literature. They first defined what transactions costs are, and what types they have in their work.
In this dissertation, their way is followed in the calculation of transaction costs. Beside their work,
in literature, we have some other ways - which are not that much different from theirs - to measure
transaction costs.
According to Walrasian world, they assume that we have perfectly competitive markets so that
an indivisible hand cares about supply and demand, therefore we do not have transaction costs.
They count transaction costs as zero. Yet, in the real world, the importance of transaction costs is
increasing. Since transaction costs are not zero anywhere in the world, the second step is showing
how one can measure these costs. Williamson (1998) measures uncertainty, transaction frequency,
asset specificity, and opportunism as being transaction costs.
1.4.1 Types of Transaction Costs
North and Wallis (1986) first define the transaction costs as the total value of resources used in
transaction sectors under the national economy, then categorize its types. Soto (1989) also defines
the missing parts from North and Wallis’ works that show the non-marketed transaction costs,
which are:
• Waiting time (includes paperwork and bureaucracy),
• Getting permits to do business,
• Cutting through red tapes,
• Bribing officials
These count as barriers or errors which one can’t be measured when calculating the transaction
costs. These errors will be defined in the methodology chapter.
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North and Wallis (1986) define transaction costs included in both transaction industries and non-




• Wholesale and retail trade - costs of exchanging and enforcing property rights.





Williamson (2010) points out the basics of transaction costs:
• Key conceptual moves - including human actions, adaptation and contract laws.
• Key operational moves - including analysis, governance and alignment.
• Applications - empirical, varieties and public policy.
1.4.2 As Quantitative Measurement of Institutional Change
In this part, North and Wallis’s methods will be discussed regarding quantitative measurement of
institutional change. They first categorize the economy as private and public, then state the types
of transaction related sectors under each part. They have the following table that categorizes the
whole economy:
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Transaction and Non-transaction Sectors
Private Public
Non-Transaction Transaction Non-Transaction Transaction
Agriculture Finance Education Public Administration
Construction Insurance Health Public Order
Mining Real Estate Rail/Air Transport Defense
Manufacturing Wholesale trade Public Utilities Postal Service
Transport/Storage Retail Trade Social Welfare
Communications
Starting from their table, for calculating transaction costs, transaction and transactional related
sectors will be addressed in this work. As defined earlier, the total value of resources used in these
sectors is counted as transaction costs and these costs absorb the main part of national income
according to literature which is given in the second chapter. Because of the increase in these costs,
it reduces the net social welfare which is also stated by North and Wallis (1986). This proves why
transaction costs have been so important beginning with the last half century.
1.5 Research Hypothesis
In the previous sections, international trade was discussed and how it impacted in the way eco-
nomic and governmental institutional change is stressed. The relationship between international
trade and institutional change is obvious and inescapable. The relationship is examined in this
chapter and the next. The other focus is on how one can measure the effects of institutional change
on the domestic economy. In the literature, the quality of institutions has mostly been measured
with the rule of law index and government effectiveness by Acemoglu, Gallego, and Robinson
(2014). Many others have also been trying to measure institutional quality and how it impacts the
GDP, international trade and investments. However, the quantitative impact of institutional change
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as a result of trade is a topic which has not been studied yet by economists. This dissertation fills
that gap in literature in the way it calculates the net welfare from international trade. We come to
this conclusion by using transaction costs which are created by institutional changes which result
from trade. To sum up, in the first step of the whole analysis, trade occurs between countries,
then the second step brings the convergence between countries as they trade. This convergence
is deeply related to the bargaining power between countries, so that a country, which has more
power than its trading partner, forces its trading partner to change its institutions. As evidenced
by Japan, starting from the later Tokugawa period and early Meiji Era, western influence showed
its impacts in Japan. In this dissertation, the institutional change is not discussed as good or bad
or in a subjective way, but it is discussed as creating new costs to the economy which affects all
households. The third step shows the transaction costs as being the impacts of institutional change.
Rather than measuring the quality of institutions, the quantitative impact is examined.
Therefore, when these steps are brought together, the net outcomes will be shown by using welfare
analysis for representative households. According to neoclassical trade theory, after trade we ex-
pect to have more consumption and more production (which is not the scope of this dissertation),
hence, households should consume more than the previous year after trade. Thus, one can expect
that trade will increase social welfare. However, in the effect of convergence and change in in-
stitutions, people have some extra costs which they have not had previously. Consequently, when
examining these costs together with the gains from trade, the net welfare of trade for representative
households will be different from what is calculated in the literature. In other words, assuming
the monotonicity of utility function, an increase in consumption - which is an expected result from
trade - leads to an increase in the utility level that raises welfare. Simultaneously, trade causes
institutional change, and it creates transaction costs which result in a reduction in the net social
welfare as stated by North and Wallis. Ultimately, the net benefits from trade are different than
what has been calculated.
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1.6 Structure of Dissertation
The structure of this dissertation is as follows. In Chapter 2, the literature review will be performed
in three different subsections including gains from trade, institutions and institutional change by
trade, and transaction costs. In Chapter 3, methodology and data will be examined. Under that
chapter the quantitative methodology includes: first, calculating the gains from trade which are
gross gains; second, measuring institutional change in the way of transaction costs; and finally,
calculating net gains from trade. In Chapter 4, the outcomes will be expressed, tables and fig-
ures will be presented, and policy recommendations will be made. In the appendix, all needed
calculations will be given.
1.7 Conclusion
In the first chapter, the main work of this dissertation was discussed. In this dissertation, there are
three main parts: international trade (as benefits), institutions, and transaction costs - as being the
effects of institutional changes. Furthermore, one of the key points is that one should be very care-
ful when defining and categorizing transaction costs, since all transaction costs cannot be measured
due to unobservable barriers. Thus, what is calculated for the transaction costs is the lower bounds
of these costs. The other key points are both the historical path of institutional change as in the
Meiji Era, and Comparative Institutional Analysis by Aoki. These points stress the main source
and importance of institutional change with its impacts over the domestic economy. Besides these
points, once benefits from trade for households are calculated, we expect to have more consump-
tion expenditure. By bringing together these three parts, stated in the first sentence above, on the
one hand, we have gains, on the other hand, we have some costs. When we subtract the latter from





The preceding introductory chapter stated the assumptions in regard to gains from trade, institu-
tional change and their spillover effect on the economy as transaction costs. According to North
(1990) the term of convergence happens between countries, and it does not matter if either coun-
try is developed or developing. As countries trade goods and services, they gradually converge
with each other. This convergence results in institutions being created or becoming more formal
if countries are informal. Even though it is hard to measure institutional quality, one can measure
its impact on the economy as transaction costs. In this dissertation, the institutional quality is not
discussed, instead its impacts on the economy are discussed. This gives the objective picture of
costs for changing institutions. In the first step of our calculation, trade occurs, and countries gain
some benefits depending on their bargaining power. The second step represents the convergence
according to the neoclassical international trade theory and builds on North’s work. Finally, trans-
action costs absorb the national expenditure/income because of change in institutions. Therefore,
on the one hand, we have some gains from trade which is calculated and accepted in the literature.
On the other hand, we have some costs as transaction costs. This study brings these two sides
together to calculate the net welfare gains as the result of trade for the representative households.
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2.2 Gains From Trade
As highlighted in Section 1.2, there are several ways to have gains from trade. Countries trade in
order to consume more, produce more, etc. However, these gains are not distributed evenly only
between trading partners due to their bargaining power, but also between representative households
in countries. In this section, gains from trade will be discussed from literature and these distinct
points will be stressed.
Melitz and Redding (2014) calculate the welfare gains from trade via the gravity equation model.
According to the authors, trade increases domestic productivity which leads to welfare gains. They
stress the reorganization of production as a result of trade so that the representative households’
welfare will increase. However, they do not show how this welfare will be distributed evenly
among all representative households.
Arkolakis, Costinot and Clare’s (2012) work is a kind of a pioneer attempt of Melitz and Redding’s
(2014) work. Arkolakis, etc. (2012) studies how big our gains are from trade. They make a con-
nection between the effects of trade and welfare which are associated with domestic expenditure
share and import elasticity. They link change in real income as a result of trade. One of the most
important points in their paper is that they take care of different real possible cases such as per-
fect competition, monopolistic competition, free and restricted entry, heterogeneity, export costs
and technological progress in order to explain these gains. Although they point out these different
cases, they do not account for bargaining power between countries. These bargaining powers im-
pact the gains from trade between countries, depending on how powerful the countries are.
The common points between these two different studies is that they calculate welfare gains by
using aggregate data with one representative household. In this dissertation all points will be taken
care of while calculating the gains from trade. In the real world, we do not have just one repre-
sentative household, we have different income groups, and different countries which have different
bargaining powers.
In another study, Burstein and Cravino (2012) link the welfare gains to between trade and aggre-
gate measure of economic activity in the way of reducing variable trade costs. They point out that
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reducing trade costs will increase the welfare gains, and as a result of reduction in these costs, trade
patterns will be changed, and they will affect the aggregate economic activity including change in
real GDP and real consumption. All papers which are discussed above show the welfare gains
from trade in different perspectives. They are mainly related to each other as results, but they are
different as methods. In addition to these works, in this paper a new way will be studied to explain
the net gains from trade as welfare analysis of different representative households, which are dis-
tributing welfare gains between them, by establishing links between trade, institutional change and
its impact on the economy as transaction costs.
As discussed above, some types of gains from trade are not the only ones we will have after trade.
Sheu (2014) shows that we will have gains from trade if we have more varieties, better qualities
and lower prices. Different from the above studies, and from this paper, Sheu studies industry level
imports for computer printers in India, and finds that better quality is the most important source for
welfare gains. If we consider again gains from trade, we realize that not only consuming or pro-
ducing more are the sources of welfare gains, but also some countries may produce better and we
can get a benefit from importing it. One of the main contributions of this dissertation does not state
that benefits from trade are decreasing, but it is showing the differences if we resolve transaction
costs which result from institutional change. In her study, lower price is also the second source of
welfare gains and the third one is the varieties. As we can see from her work, better quality lead to
more dependability so that people will use computer printers for a long time, which affects welfare
positively as well as their utility.
Relationships between countries also plays a crucial role when we explain welfare gains from
trade. Anderson and Wincoop (2001) investigate the borders effect on trade. According to them,
less regulation and more integration will cause large potential welfare gains. Since all countries
have different institutions, national borders will have an important impact on trade. Eaton and
Kortum (2002) also stress the importance of reducing barriers which will lead to increases in tech-
nology and welfare gains. In both studies, they use a gravity equation to explain the borders’
effect and find the negative relationship between borders and trade. Anderson and Wincoop sug-
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gest less regulation which will decrease the convergence between countries, so they will incur less
transaction costs. This is the point which is connected to this work. It is to be trading with coun-
tries without forcing them to change their institutions and without converging them with their own
countries. Thus, people’s welfare will be different from what is calculated if transaction costs are
being resolved.
Eaton and Kortum show the technology gain and welfare gains in the manufacturing industry in
some OECD countries. In their paper, they are trying to calculate benefits from trade in terms of
geographic barriers and technology, which determine specialization. It can be seen how we have
different ways to calculate benefits from trade in theory. In this work, the net gains from trade
are the main purpose to be calculated for all representative households which are different income
groups.
Starting from the points stated above, when countries trade with each other the interaction between
them is unavoidable. In North’s book (1990), according to Neoclassical International Trade The-
ory, countries would converge as they trade goods and services. This convergence will be not only
between developed and developing countries, but also among industrialized countries. Therefore,
change in institutions will be unavoidable so that its spillover effect on the economy as a transac-
tion cost will affect everybody. In another study by him, with Joseph Wallis (1986), they state that
an increase in the transaction costs reduces net social welfare. They found the relationship when
they calculated the rise in the transaction costs in the US economy between 1870 and 1970. In
Waugh’s (2010) work one can see the income differences between countries as they trade. One
of the critical points in his work is asymmetry as being a trade cost which is linked to bargaining
power between both developed and developing countries, as well as among developed countries.
In his paper, he makes the distinction between trade costs. For example, poor countries are facing
higher costs to export relative to richer countries. This is related to transformation costs which is
not the scope of this work. We are mainly addressing the transaction costs part which is one of
the key scopes of this work. Waugh (2010) discusses the systematic asymmetry between countries
that will cause countries to converge to more formal ones which leads to having more transaction
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costs. In my work, formalizing institutions is not counted as good or bad means to connect with
the rest of the world. Yet, the cost of changing institutions should be resolved in order to reach the
net benefits from trade among countries.
As explained above, there are several ways to state trade costs, which include barriers, then ge-
ography as in Anderson & Wincoop and Eaton & Kortum’s work, and then language similarities
or differences and colonial relationship as in Cyrus (2014). Even though these transaction costs
are not directly counted as trade cost, they are indirectly related and their impact on the domestic
economy is important. When we come back to the work done by Waugh (2010), we see that trade
frictions between rich and poor countries are stated. He stresses the importance of import share and
of investigating the international income differences. In his work, he gives the example of trade
shares between the US, Japan and Senegal. Since the US has more import share from Japan than
Senegal, exporting costs in Japan are lower than in Senegal. This is coming from systematic asym-
metries which is introduced by him. In his empirical work, when countries trade with each other
in the OECD zone, the income differences are reduced by up to 23%. From the point of systematic
asymmetry, if countries have equal market access, which is associated with bargaining power, the
international income differences are reduced by up to 31%. When he brings these two concepts
together, international income differences are reduced by up to 59% and 41%, respectively.
Reducing trade costs play a significant role in having more gains from trade. Transaction costs
which are related to trade are also important while explaining welfare gains. Baeten and Butter
(2006) show the empirical example for the Netherlands for reducing transaction costs which leads
to an increase in welfare. In their paper, they focus on buying (outsourcing) without losing any
jobs. Outsourcing is associated with transaction costs. As explained in the first chapter, transac-
tion costs include searching for information, enforcement costs, bargaining, monitoring etc. These
costs are linked both domestically and internationally when countries trade. Baeten and Butter
(2006) state that reducing these costs by increasing knowledge and trust between countries will in-
crease welfare gains. They suggest some ways including government intervention, but that causes
domestic transaction costs and increasing trust by credit rating agencies, certification, common
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database and reputations. They also point to the importance of specialization and that making out-
sourcing and trade innovations are important for reducing trade transaction costs.
Butter’s work with Mosch (2003) shows the important point of reducing transaction cost by in-
creasing trust between countries. In their work, the causal relationship between trade and trust level
according to the World Value Survey (WVS hereafter) database, both formal and informal trust has
a significant impact on bilateral trade volume, so countries trade more, but incur less transaction
costs. According to them, legal similarities and cultural background, as stated by Cyrus (2014),
play a crucial role by increasing trade flows as they expect. In their analysis, they take 15 European
Union (EU, hereafter) countries, and state the cultural and legal similarities between them in order
to explain the increase in trust. However, increase in trade flows between these countries is mainly
coming from a lesser distance, using a common currency, and with legal similarities not mainly
from trust. In literature, transaction costs are high in both developed and in developing members
of EU countries. The reasons why they have high transaction costs are left for future research.
In literature, we have many important ways to increase welfare as well as decrease trade costs. In
this work, calculating the benefits from trade, or welfare gains from trade, will be different from
the literature. Although some economists take care of transaction costs, they only care about trans-
action costs during international exchange. International trade and convergence result in increases
in transaction costs domestically, so it will negatively affect all people in those countries. Hence,
net gains will be different from what is calculated so far in the literature.
2.3 Institutions and Institutional Change by Trade
In the preceding section, gains from trade ways were discussed, and as a result of trade there is a
convergence between countries. One of the sources for change in institutions comes from interna-
tional trade. As stated above, North (1990) points out that according to neoclassical international
trade theory there will be convergence between countries after trade. This convergence happens in
the way of changing or building up new institutions. In this section, the relationship between trade
and institutions and an historical way of convergence will be discussed.
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Do and Levchenko (2009) discuss the trade and institutional quality relationship in their paper.
According to them, after trade, small elite groups (larger firms) in the country want to have in-
stitutional quality low in order to keep most of the exports, and therefore profits, in their hands.
Thus, smaller firms will have a barrier, institution, to entering the market. The importance of eco-
nomic institutions, including quality of contract enforcement, property rights, rule of law of index,
etc., has been increasing to explain economic performance in countries. Acemoglu, Robinson, and
Johnson (2005) stated the idea of economic performance and institutional quality relations. Do and
Levchenko (2009) make the political equilibrium modeling in order to compare the institutional
quality between trade and autarky case. After trade openings, small elite groups make the entry
costs high so that smaller firms cannot operate, therefore these elite groups make all the profits.
Even though institutional quality and profits by firms are not the scope of this dissertation, the idea
of trade opening and its effects on institutions are the key point to bridge the gap between trade and
change in institutions. This point proves that there is a convergence between countries after trade
so that one can see the change in institutions and measure their impacts on the economy which is
the idea of this paper.
In another of Levchenko’s (2013) study, he stresses the importance of trade and change in the in-
stitutional quality in his work. In his paper, trade partners are forced to change the quality of their
institutions after opening. This change in institutional quality will be positive, unlike the previ-
ous case. Hence, improvement in the institutional quality impacts the economy positively. In his
previous work with Do (2009), he notes that without having better institutions, some rent-seeking
parties would capture all rents. In the work (2013), the main idea is having the better institutional
qualities by countries so that no rent-seeking parties could capture rents, and therefore, countries
will have a political economy equilibrium case. These studies show the significant relationship
between trade and institutions, but they are also stating the difficulties of measuring institutional
quality due to the lack of data. This dissertation is separate from measuring institution quality. Ac-
cording to literature, it is historically proven that trade causes institutional change, and this change
is not free. Even though it is hard to measure institutional quality, one can measure its impacts on
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the economy via transaction costs channels which will be discussed thoroughly in the next section.
Since institutional quality plays a key role in explaining economic performance, Dollar and Kray
(2002) empirically state that trade, institutional quality and growth go in the same direction in the
long run. In their work, one can see that better institutions help countries trade more. This is the
first analysis in their work which shows the positive and significant relationship between them.
The second analysis in their study is that to see the years effected, they apply dynamic regression
and conclude that trade and institutional quality are coming from both historical and geographical
backgrounds. Their findings are statistically significant in that both trade-institutional quality and
growth, especially in the long-run, have a positive relationship. All in all, it can be realized that one
cannot separate trade and its effect on institutional change in countries. The quality of institutions
is not the topic of this work, however, to make a connection between trade and institutions, it will
provide the opportunity to calculate the impacts of institutions domestically.
In one case, North, D.C. (1990) is the one who first attempted to explain the historical convergence
after countries trade goods and services. As countries converge on each other, there will be diver-
gence between societies from the past to the future which proves the change in societies. In his
book, transaction costs are taken care of as the result of change in institutions. According to neo-
classical international trade theory, there will be convergence between countries as they exchange
goods and services. This convergence happens both in developed nations, for example between
Japan and the USA, and between developing and developed nations, as developed nations force
the developing nations to change their institutions after they start to trade. These forces are coming
from countries’ bargaining power which is the other proof of why trade affects institutions. Trade
happens due to the differences of relative prices. Also, countries have bargaining powers. North
(1990) determines that these two points are crucial sources of institutional change. He also states
the importance of transaction costs as a measurement of the institutions, and he stresses transaction
costs as the most observable dimension of the institutional frame. From his point, calculating trans-
action costs as the measurement of institutional change will give the results of why institutional
change is not free lunch.
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2.4 Transaction Costs
The connection between trade and institutional change is obvious. Starting from this connection, to
finalize all relationships for calculating the net welfare from trade, the measurement of transaction
costs is playing a significant role. Even though one cannot measure all the transaction costs in the
economy, what is calculated will be the lower level of transaction costs, which is explained in the
next chapter.
According to Meramveliotakis and Milonakis (2010), standard neoclassical theory assumes that
transaction costs are zero, but the new institutionalist perspective, starting with North, counts
transaction costs as among the most important explanatory variables of institutional change. In
their paper, transaction costs are divided into three important parts including market transaction
costs, supervisory transaction costs, and property rights transaction costs. They also point out
that there is the objectivist, which is a quantitative measurement, and the subjectivist, which is a
qualitative measurement. All are discussed in the first chapter. In this section the importance of
transaction costs will be discussed as the result of change in institutions. In Wallis and North’s
(1994) work, the importance of transaction costs in the economic activities are stressed in the way
of productivity and growth. They state that increases in transaction costs may play a negative role
in economic growth.
When we go back in history, Coase, R.H. (1937) is the one who first discussed the institutions
during economic activity. He makes a connection between two assumptions in economic theory,
such that resources are allocated by price mechanisms, so no institutional arrangement is neces-
sary, which is the neoclassical world, and the resource allocation is dependent on the coordinators.
Even though we assume no uncertainty, yet we have uncertainty.
Ronald Coase (1988, p. 6) states the importance of transaction costs that Without the concept
of transaction costs, which is largely absent from current economic theory, it is my contention that
it is impossible to understand the working of the economic system, to analyze many of its problems
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in a useful way, or to have a basis for determining policy.
Starting from Ronald Coase, right now we have two significant questions: "What are transaction
costs?" and "How can one measure them?" Wang (2003) shows the ways of measuring transaction
costs from literature. In his paper, he states that transaction costs include the cost of price mech-
anism, by Coase, as being the margin between what the consumer pays and what the producer
receives, according to Niehan (1987), and the cost of negotiation and enforcement according to
Williamson, and, finally, and most importantly in this work, the transaction costs are measured as
the value of resources used in transacting sectors according to North-Wallis (1986). In this disser-
tation, transaction costs will be calculated for Japan by following North-Wallis’s way, then taking
them as costs to the equation to calculate net welfare from trade.
In their pioneer work, Wallis and North (1986) calculated the transaction costs for the US economy
from 1870 to 1970. They are the pioneer economists who measured these costs for an economy.
In their empiric paper, they state the importance of transaction costs during an exchange. Also,
they define transaction costs as capturing gains from trade since cost of information is not free
lunch. What they find is that in the US economy almost 47% of GNP was devoted to transacting in
1970, increasing from 24% in 1870. If we take care of the government expenditure on transaction
services and pay salaries for government employees in transactional related jobs, almost 55% of
GNP was devoted to transacting in 1970, increasing from 26% in 1870. From their pioneer work,
it can be seen that transaction costs are capturing gains from national income. They also state
in their paper, increases in transaction cost reduces net social welfare. Hence, the importance of
transaction costs seems obvious. As following on their work, Dollery and Leong (1998) calculated
the transaction cost for the Australian economy between 1911 and 1991 and found that the value
of resources consumed in both private and public transacting sectors increased from 32% to 59%
of GDP. When we bring these two papers together, at least for the same periods, the large and
increasing proportion of national expenditure is absorbed by transaction costs.
In New Zealand, Tim Hazledine (2001) modified the Wallis-North way and investigated the ratio of
transaction to transformation sectors between 1956 to 1996 and concluded that the ratio increased
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from .36→ .86 if he takes care of unemployment, otherwise the ratio increased from .36→ .68. In
the Bulgarian and Polish economies, one can see similar results that Chobanov and Egbert (2007)
measured for the transaction cost in the Bulgarian economy for the years 1997-2003 and found
that the share of transacting sectors in GDP increased from 37% to 52%. For the Polish economy,
Suleyewicz and Grace (2005) also followed Wallis-North’s way and concluded there was an in-
crease in transaction sectors for the years between 1996-2002. They found that the ratio of total
transaction services to the GDP increased from 49.7% to 67.25%.
All these studies and others, which are not discussed here, show the increasing importance of trans-
action costs for the economies. The reasons behind them vary such as modernization, converging
to formal countries, forcing other countries to change their institutions because of trade, etc. It
depends on the country’s case. The ways of calculating transaction costs varies, but the frame is
clear. As discussed in the previous chapter, transaction costs mainly include finance, insurance,
wholesale and retail trade, banking sector or, in general, service sectors under a national account.
These costs absorb the big part of national expenditure so that it will cause cost increases for all
people then decrease in net social welfare which is calculated in the next chapter.
2.5 Conclusion
According to the literature discussed above, calculating gains from trade is obvious. Welfare gains
from international trade are calculated as aggregated, including increases in real income, increases
in domestic expenditure, lowering of prices, including qualities, etc. Change in institutions is
coming from either modernization or converging with another country through trade. Hence, trade
plays a crucial role in how nations experience changes in their institutions. Trade particularly
affects the quality of institutions however this is not the scope of this study. This dissertation
examines the cost side of institutional change. Transaction costs are becoming one of the most
important parts of international economics and institutional economics. In North’s book (1990),
he states that the effects of the institutional change are a "mixed bag" which includes both positive
affects by protecting contracts, property rights, reducing uncertainty, etc., and negative impacts
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such as causing a rise in transaction costs which absorb the national income from representative
households. To sum up, all three important steps which were explained in the previous chapter will
be examined and will present the net gains from international trade considering the cost side of the





In the preceding chapters, the theoretical background of the study was discussed, and methods of
calculations gains from trade were discussed. In this work, in order to calculate net welfare anal-
ysis for representative households, all things are brought together on the same page and conclude
the net welfare analysis. Heckscher (1919) states that numeraire should be chosen as the unit of
measure. Change in people’s expenditures provides the change in their utilities. How do they have
changes in their utilities as trade volumes changes? To answer this question in this chapter, gross
gains will be calculated from trade. Transaction costs will be calculated as the impacts of institu-
tional change, and finally the difference will be called net gains from trade.
North (1990) states that if net gains will be formulated,
NG = ∆C−∆TC− errors1 and NG = ∆Li−∆TC− errors 2
for years T = t, t +1, t +2, · · · , t +n
and i = lowest, secondlowest, middle, secondhighest, highest income
1Look at below
2As discussed above, there could be some errors since all transaction costs can not be observed and so measured.
Therefore, what we have as transaction costs, they are lower bounds in our linear model.
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Details are provided in the next sections.
3.2 The Quantitative Methodology
In this section, the source of data and the results for calculations will be given. To get the most
balanced database, there could be some time intervals. The aim of the work is to calculate the
net gains from trade. In this work, not only one representative household’s welfare is taken into
account, but also more than one representative households’ - which are different income groups -
welfare are considered to have the most efficient results. This is another key point of this paper
that fills another gap in the literature.
3.2.1 Calculating Gains from Trade
In the neoclassical world, we expect to have more consumption as we trade more and more. In this
section, calculating gross gains is discussed.
For the years T = t, t +1, t +2, · · · , t +n, trade volume is provided and in order to eliminate trend
effects the difference between years will be taken and the average change will be calculated be-
tween time intervals. The formulation is:
All trade equations below represent the change between years. Here all calculations are based
on per-person terms.
• Trade Volume (Tr) = EX + IM (1)
• ∆Tr = Trt+1−Trt (2)
• Avgtr = (Trt+nTrt )
1
n −1 (3)
• TrGDP = Trade share o f GDP
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• ∆TrGDP = TrGDPt+1 −TrGDPt (4)






• Ex = Exports and Im = Imports
• ∆Ex = Ext+1−Ext (6)
• AvgEx = (Ext+nExt )
1
n −1 (7)
• ∆Im = Imt+1− Imt (8)
• AvgIm = ( Imt+nImt )
1
n −1 (9)
From equation 1 to 9, in total trade volume, as stated above, in the following years the differences
are taken into account. And the average growth rate of trade volume is considered to eliminate
trend effects. The same procedure is applied for the trade share of GDP, exports and imports.
From this point, we can see how these changes impact representative households’ consumption
expenditure.
• C =Consumption Expenditure which represents all households if we consider all represen-
tative households to be identical. Here all calculations are based in per-person terms, and to
eliminate trend affects, de-trending is applied.
• ∆C =Ct+1−Ct (10) represents the change in consumption expenditure between years.
• AvgC = (Ct+nCt )
1
n −1 (11)
If we consider different income groups including:
`1 = lowest `2 = secondlowest `3 = middle `4 = secondhighest `5 = highest
so that we have 5 different income groups. Since all income groups have different average and
marginal consumption expenditures, results from gains from trade are considered separately.
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• L = Living Expenditure which represents the living expenditures in these different income
groups. All equations below represent the change in consumption expenditure between
years. All calculations are based on per-person terms. To eliminate trend affects, de-trending
is applied for living expenditures in different representative households.
• Moreover, each different income group has a different number of per-persons in households,
so these differences are taken into account.
• ∆L`1 = L`1t+1−L
`1
t (12)






• ∆L`2 = L`2t+1−L
`2
t (14)






• ∆L`3 = L`3t+1−L
`3
t (16)










• ∆L`4 = L`4t+1−L
`4
t (18)






• ∆L`5 = L`5t+1−L
`5
t (20)










From equation 10 to 21, changes and average in consumption expenditure for all households and
different income groups will be calculated to see the effects of trade volume on consumption ex-
penditure.
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3.2.2 Measuring the Institutional Change by Transaction Costs
In this part, the quantitative measurement of institutional change will be calculated for the same
selected years as done in the previous section in order to have balanced data. Since transaction
costs are the key elements in measuring institutional impacts on the economy, public, private and
total transaction costs will be considered in calculations. To be consistent, de-trending methods
are also applied in measuring both public and private transaction costs.
• Total Transaction Costs = Public Transaction Costs+Private Transaction Costs which
represents the total transaction costs for the years T = t, t +1, t +2, · · · , t +n
• ∆Gtc = Gtct+1−Gtct (22) represents the change in public transaction costs between years.






• ∆Ptc = Ptct+1−Ptct (24) represents the change in private transaction costs between years.






• GtcGDP = (
Gtct
GDPt
) (26) represents the share of public transaction costs in GDP.










• PtcGDP = (
Ptct
GDPt
) (28) represents the share of private transaction costs in GDP.










3.2.3 Calculating the Net Gains from Trade in Japan
Gross gains will be calculated from given equations above for Japanese households by assuming all
representative households are both identical and different. For the transaction costs, I assume that
all people are identical, since everybody incurs the same costs as a result of institutional change.
Therefore, after de-trending in each variable, I take the difference between gross gains per person
and total transaction costs per person to obtain the net gains from trade.
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Finally, net gains will be:
Net Gains = ∆C︸︷︷︸
GrossGains
− (∆Gtc +∆Ptc)︸ ︷︷ ︸
TotalTransactionCosts
− errors
=⇒ by assuming all representative households are identical. For each individual year.
Net Gains = ∆Li︸︷︷︸
GrossGains
− (∆Gtc +∆Ptc)︸ ︷︷ ︸
TotalTransactionCosts
− errors
=⇒ by assuming we have different income groups as i = `1, `2, `3, `4, `5. For each individual year.
3.3 Data Used in the Study
To get the most balanced database, sources from the Japanese Statistical Agency were used, in-
cluding:
• Economic and Social Research Institute, Cabinet Office, Government of Japan.
• Statistical Survey Department, Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Commu-
nications.
• Department of National Accounts, Economic and Social Research Institute, Cabinet Office.
• Historical Statistics of Japan
World Wealth and Income databases, and International Historical Statistics are used. From these
sources the following were used: national accounts, trade volumes, family expenditures, transac-
tion costs, input-output tables, income distributions, and population information. Detail addresses
are given in the references section.
3.3.1 Descriptive Statistics
Here all variables used in the analysis are explained. There are two different periods which are
called the historical and modern period.
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1. Historical Period 1885-1940
• National Account
– Gross national product is used till 1930, then gross domestic product.
– At current prices in yen.
• Consumption Expenditure includes;
– Food, housing, medical care, transportation-communication, education, cultural-
social recreation, miscellaneous.
– At current prices in yen
– Estimates by Ohkawa, Takamatsu, and Yamamato.
• Transaction Costs includes mainly public transaction costs due to lack of private trans-
action costs. Service sectors covers public, domestic and professional services, and
public administration. At current prices in yen.
• Trade Volume includes export and import at current prices in yen.
2. Modern Period 1955-2014
• National Account
– Gross Domestic Expenditure.
– At current prices in yen
• Living Expenditure for worker’s households in all cities from 1955-2003 then it in-
cludes agricultural and other households. As explained above, each different income
group has a different number of persons.
– Food, housing, medical care, transportation-communication, education, cultural-
social recreation, miscellaneous.
– At current prices in yen.
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• Transaction Costs here is divided between public and private transaction costs. As
explained in section 1.4.2, transaction costs include:
– Finance/Insurance, Real Estate, Whole sale/retail trade are counted as private trans-
action costs.
– Public services and public administration are counted as public transaction costs.
– At current prices in yen.
• Trade Volume includes exports and imports at current prices in yen.
3.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, the previous theoretical idea is brought together on the same page. In Japan, starting
from the Meiji Era, because of trade, institutional change has been occurring and the impacts on
the economy have been significantly increasing. It will be inescapable to measure the real/net
benefits from trade, as taken care of transaction costs under the same linear equation. From these
calculations, different net gains will be seen in the next chapter.
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Chapter 4
Policy Implications and Conclusions
4.1 Introduction
Types of gains from trade are discussed in section 1.2.2. Change or an increase in consumption
expenditure is one of the main purposes of international trade. People trade to consume more,
produce more, etc. As shown in Figure 4.1, trade plays a vital role in Japan’s national account.
Japan’s trade share on its national account increased from 6-7% in the 1880s to peak level which
was more than 40% then finally around 25% in the 1940s. Therefore, it is expected to have an
increase in consumption expenditure. Assuming the monotonicity of utility functions, an increase
in consumption expenditure will lead to an increase in utility level and finally a rise in social
welfare. As in Table 4.2 and Figure 4.3, increased gross gains can be seen. However, transaction
costs should not be forgotten. Starting from the Meiji Era, which was explained in detail in section
1.3, an increase in trade volume and the impacts of Western influences led to a change in institutions
in Japan. Hence, transaction costs were created. When the transaction costs are added to the
equations for calculations, different net gains are obtained as in the Table 4.2 and Figure 4.3.
According to North and Wallis, an increase in transaction costs reduces net social welfare. The
opposite is also true in this relationship which means that a decrease in transaction costs raises
net social welfare. We see this fact clearly after the 1997 Asian crisis, where there was almost a
consistent decline in total transaction costs, and therefore, in the modern period, the decrease in
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net gains isn’t seen till the mid-1990s. Then there was an increase in net gains after the late 1990s
which is also seen in Figure 4.7, 4.8, and 4.9. To sum up, this dissertation proves that the net gains
will be different if transaction costs, which are the quantitative impacts of institutional change, are
included in the calculations.
4.2 Outcomes
In this section, outcomes are discussed in two different periods. The first period, which is called
the historical period, covers the years between 1885 and 1940, and the second period, which is
called the modern period, covers the years between 1955 and 2014. As explained in section 3.3,
these are the years to obtain the balanced data sets for each variable which is used in the analysis.
Also, there is a cut point between 1940 and 1955 due to the Second World War. Tables and figures
are shown below. Moreover, the appendix section includes:
• Gross gains for each individual year (as change between years) for both identical households,
and different household groups.
• Total transaction costs change between years.
• Share of total transaction costs are also given per-year as private and public for the modern
period, and only as total in the historical period.
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4.2.1 The Historical Period Outcomes
The period includes the years from 1885 to 1940. Tables and figures are shown below. It can be
easily seen that trade volume, including exports and imports per-person and trade share as percent-
age, increased over the years as in Table 4.1 and Figure 4.1 and 4.2.
Thus, as shown in Table 4.2 and Figure 4.3 transaction costs are increasing because of changes
in institutions. These changes in institutions are coming from international trade. Therefore, the
conclusion is that there is a decrease in net social welfare which proves North and Wallis.
As in Table 4.3 and Figure 4.4, tthe only different point is that the share of total transaction costs
seems to have a decreasing trend in the historical period. Japan had a higher growth rate of national
income due to the increase in war/defense expenditures than the transaction costs. However, the
growth rate of transaction costs is still high.
Table 1 g* (Avg. growth rate of detrend) 1885-1939
Trade Volume (Ex+Im) Trade Share of National Income Export Import
6.009% .62% 8.46% 4.24%
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Figure 4.2: Exports and Imports per person-Historical Period
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Table 2 g* (Avg. growth rate of detrend) 1885-1939
Gross Gains Total Transaction Costs Net Gains
7.54% 20.34% 4.86%




































































































































































































































































Detrend of Net gains-per-person
Figure 4.3: Gross and Net Gains per person-Historical Period
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Table 3 g (Average growth rate) 1885-1940
GNP-GDP Transaction Costs
7.2% 6.6%
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Share of TCs on GNP-GDP
Figure 4.4: Transaction Costs-Historical Period
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4.2.2 The Modern Period Outcomes
The modern period includes the years from 1955 to 2014. Tables and figure are shown below. Here
Table 4.4 and Figure 4.5 and 4.6 show that trade volume, including exports and imports per-person
and trade share as percentage, increased over years.
Hence, as shown in Table 4.5 and Figure 4.7, 4.8, and 4.9 there is a rise in the gross gains which
are coming mainly from increases in trade volume. There is also another increase in the transaction
costs which are coming from change mainly in institutions, then the conclusion is that the net gains
are decreasing in the years if transaction costs are increasing. Also, the net gains are increasing if
transaction costs are decreasing.
Table 4.6, and 4.7 and Figure 4.10 provide the growth rate of public and private transaction costs
so that total transaction costs and national income can be seen. Therefore, the share of transaction
costs has been increasing over the years in the modern period even though there’s a decline after
the 2000s due to the Asian crisis and the recent 2007-2008 crisis.
Table 4 g* (Average growth rate of detrend) 1955-2014
Trade Volume (Ex+Im) Trade Share of National Income Export Import
5.8% 0.27% 6% 5.64%
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Figure 4.6: Export and Import per person-Modern Period
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Table 5 g*(Avg. growth rate of detrend of gross gains) 1955-2014 Per-person
Lowest Second Lowest Middle Second Highest Highest
5.59% 4.66% 3.12% 2.41% 6.55%
Table 4.5: Gross Gains per person in Modern Period
Avg. growth rate of detrend of total transaction costs is 1.85%. Due to the crises in the
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Detrend of Total Transaction Costs-per 
person
Figure 4.9: Gross and Net Gains per representative households-Modern Period
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Table 6 g (Averega growth rate) 1955-2014 per-person
Private Transaction Costs Public Transaction Costs Total Transaction costs
7.091% 6.59% 6.97%
Table 4.6: Public and Private Transaction Costs
Table 7 g (Averega growth rate) 1955-2014
Gross Domestic Expenditure Total Transaction Costs
7% 7.58%
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Figure 4.10: Transaction Costs-Modern Period
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4.3 Policy Implication and Conclusion
Countries trade to obtain some benefits. In the literature we have several important benefits in-
cluding more consumption, more production, better quality, more varieties, lower prices, etc. This
dissertation is aimed to calculate the net benefits from international trade as evidenced by Japan.
According to neoclassical international trade theory, countries would gradually converge with each
other as they trade goods and services. In Japan, starting from the late decades of the Tokugawa
period and mainly the early years of the Meiji Period, the volume of trade had risen between Japan
and the Western World. As a result of trade, Western influences in Japan caused a change in institu-
tions. These changes happened not only in government and economic organizations, but they also
happened in the society. As stated above, the theory states the convergence between countries as
they trade. Therefore, new institutional environments and their quantitative impacts as transaction
costs were created. When one looks at the simple national income data he/she would see a rise in
trade volume, and a rise in consumption expenditure over years. However, this dissertation elim-
inates the trend affects as it takes the differences between each following year to show the gross
gains for each individual year. This is the first step to calculate the net gains from trade. In the sec-
ond step, as pointed out above, countries would gradually converge with each other, change their
institutions, especially forcing the trade partner to change its institutions, for the purpose of unity.
This would create transaction costs which is the last step. Hence, all people would incur these
transaction costs. North and Wallis state a vital point that an increase in transaction costs causes a
decrease in net social welfare. This dissertation brings these points together to show that changes
in transaction costs affect the net social welfare. Therefore, in both cases the net benefits would
be different. To sum up, this dissertation proves the crucial ideas. Firstly, the neoclassical inter-
national trade theory is bringing convergency. Secondly, the new institutional analysis by North
is pointing out the importance and impacts of institutions. Finally, the comparative institutional
analysis by Aoki is pointing out the diversity gains across the world or at least no gains would be
realized as having unity in the world. As shown in the above tables and figures, the conclusion
and proof of the above ideas is that trade provides an increase in consumption expenditure and
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causes changes in institutions. The economic impacts of institutions are quantitatively measured
by transaction costs in this dissertation, so that trade indirectly causes a rise in transaction costs via
changes in institutions. Therefore, the net gain would be different than what has been calculated
so far. These results also prove the monotonicity of utility functions. Finally, this dissertation does
not aim to say changes in institutions are bad, unnecessary or have negative impacts. However,
while one is calculating the net benefits from trade, the trade and institutional change relationship
are needed to be counted in the analysis to obtain the most efficient and correct results.
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This section includes; gross gains for each individual year (as change between years) for both
identical households, and different household groups, total transaction costs change between years,
share of total transaction costs are also given per-year as private and public for the modern period,
and only as total in the historical period.
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Table A-1 Detrend of Per-Person Variables
Years Gross Gains Transaction Costs Net Gains
1885 -0.570991074 -0.000882441 -0.570108633
1886 0.88244075 -0.137193583 1.019634333
1887 0.337403816 0.015650346 0.32175347
1888 1.0720474 0.060286855 1.011760545
1889 2.814969534 1.311133792 1.503835742
1890 0.839552317 -0.171268673 1.01082099
1891 -0.370390728 0.46644539 -0.836836118
1892 0.855800194 -0.15698524 1.012785434
1893 0.916014764 1.438472005 -0.522457241
1894 3.546621264 1.07446183 2.472159434
1895 3.47615859 0.75282321 2.72333538
1896 5.566551256 2.914312714 2.652238542
1897 5.025016683 2.069158903 2.95585778
1898 -0.770047225 -0.921889249 0.151842024
1899 3.108542544 3.378821876 -0.270279332
1900 -0.864530672 -0.08478991 -0.779740761
1901 1.336929735 1.226815835 0.1101139
1902 2.048911484 0.493570403 1.55534108
1903 2.791894316 3.254632094 -0.462737779
1904 -0.101845176 4.993109247 -5.094954424
1905 0.288600786 -2.99488903 3.283489816
1906 9.625878156 0.736359729 8.889518427
1907 1.349548261 1.352678404 -0.003130143
1908 -0.811774657 -1.173125217 0.36135056
1909 1.009094362 0.331944597 0.677149765
1910 5.771147333 2.813231322 2.95791601
1911 6.209950348 1.460853155 4.749097193
1912 4.100214949 -0.067764083 4.167979033
1913 -7.323005119 0.461594707 -7.784599826
1914 -0.535639194 -0.307893513 -0.227745681
1915 8.972650477 5.851115815 3.121534662
1916 22.5282144 10.3647829 12.1634315
1917 41.642539 8.938003111 32.70453589
1918 63.67712051 24.24363353 39.43348698
1919 -2.983970664 5.903224571 -8.887195235
1920 -5.24610443 4.345549605 -9.591654035
1921 4.813946121 3.004512996 1.809433125
1922 1.011326986 0.114275366 0.89705162
1923 3.386050257 2.665924116 0.720126141
1924 6.919222014 -1.011304496 7.93052651
1925 -9.797685771 1.744103819 -11.54178959
1926 -6.56491176 -2.959813507 -3.605098252
1927 -1.842057757 4.746916239 -6.588973997
1928 -9.406170625 -5.364280366 -4.041890259
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Table A-1 Detrend of Per-Person Variables
Years Gross Gains Transaction Costs Net Gains
1929 -17.3097766 -12.3914423 -4.918334306
1930 -19.33369982 -10.36518488 -8.968514936
1931 -1.438819546 7.296327042 -8.735146588
1932 13.32779857 7.738960831 5.588837739
1933 16.18949499 2.608359535 13.58113546
1934 5.828511678 -1.724903628 7.553415306
1935 7.169582049 3.580906257 3.588675792
1936 23.99707406 13.16516281 10.83191126
1937 11.39234349 14.56385487 -3.171511378
1938 25.45879655 19.53283158 5.925964977
1939 31.12939726 23.36563913 7.763758125
1940 0 0 0
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Table A-2 Detrend of Per-Person Variables in Different Income Groups
Years GG-L NG-L GG-SL NG-SL GG-M NG-M GG-SH NG-SH GG-H NG-H Total TCs
1955 3605.33 67.18 5286.51 1748.35 5698.69 2160.54 9148.10 5609.95 1869.41263 -1668.738 3538.151
1956 2511.48 -1899.33 3497.82 -912.99 3857.94 -552.87 2196.96 -2213.85 13176.27481 8765.47 4410.805
1957 1478.00 -1535.32 2430.68 -582.65 4680.20 1666.87 5487.44 2474.12 7213.160273 4199.833 3013.327
1958 2888.94 -1810.99 3818.43 -881.51 5015.86 315.93 6035.97 1336.04 7589.57529 2889.641 4699.934
1959 7128.25 -562.05 7478.67 -211.63 6749.01 -941.30 5902.49 -1787.82 13155.88571 5465.581 7690.305
1960 6203.32 -5002.23 8721.37 -2484.19 10518.81 -686.75 14700.36 3494.80 13885.09405 2679.537 11205.56
1961 11421.34 1675.95 13720.71 3975.33 12646.73 2901.35 14964.49 5219.11 17752.96697 8007.585 9745.382
1962 1994.28 -8955.41 3938.26 -7011.43 6270.26 -4679.43 5363.76 -5585.93 4472.033898 -6477.659 10949.69
1963 11299.73 -3276.69 12806.85 -1769.57 10079.41 -4497.01 10758.44 -3817.98 14426.41667 -149.9995 14576.42
1964 10337.05 -1914.98 12559.37 307.33 11319.49 -932.55 17022.78 4770.74 9779.647033 -2472.389 12252.04
1965 7523.06 -13200.47 8101.20 -12622.33 18154.52 -2569.02 12982.92 -7740.62 24394.87296 3671.338 20723.54
1966 11938.92 -6060.15 15273.33 -2725.73 15534.65 -2464.41 20281.62 2282.56 25345.58668 7346.523 17999.06
1967 24259.91 -188.90 19094.56 -5354.25 21218.67 -3230.14 23164.80 -1284.01 22219.88128 -2228.927 24448.81
1968 20644.10 -4357.79 26499.75 1497.86 28446.42 3444.53 27286.62 2284.73 24617.00438 -384.8875 25001.89
1969 23540.22 -10402.79 31073.39 -2869.62 25016.13 -8926.88 27783.00 -6160.02 41559.32763 7616.317 33943.01
1970 22103.94 -6183.05 22160.39 -6126.60 26530.25 -1756.73 33926.19 5639.20 40731.80958 12444.82 28286.99
1971 20255.36 -19385.47 23716.62 -15924.22 28176.79 -11464.05 28375.55 -11265.29 32103.21255 -7537.626 39640.84
1972 45172.38 -17057.43 48360.60 -13869.21 50725.17 -11504.64 63201.68 971.87 75085.58212 12855.77 62229.81
1973 10317.54 -69603.65 38353.98 -41567.21 57002.82 -22918.36 78050.05 -1871.14 203148.7323 123227.5 79921.19
1974 32574.16 -15080.09 52066.22 4411.98 68409.05 20754.81 76957.56 29303.32 148789.4339 101135.2 47654.25
1975 90034.99 31526.36 74904.96 16396.33 66950.82 8442.19 70504.65 11996.02 -43950.4993 -102459.1 58508.63
1976 64691.55 9119.35 60297.64 4725.44 50268.67 -5303.53 55872.92 300.73 41272.66676 -14299.53 55572.2
1977 19497.77 -36257.67 9117.53 -46637.90 40939.38 -14816.05 22795.36 -32960.08 41950.30291 -13805.13 55755.44
1978 24714.29 -31604.23 47520.89 -8797.63 26475.29 -29843.23 49647.76 -6670.76 74287.66096 17969.14 56318.52
1979 39039.94 -9923.56 42659.24 -6304.26 45785.09 -3178.42 45143.93 -3819.58 68201.51815 19238.01 48963.51
1980 38035.46 5426.01 21521.85 -11087.60 43714.33 11104.87 58296.05 25686.59 69783.64476 37174.19 32609.46
1981 31395.92 -10742.34 46282.62 4144.36 36305.80 -5832.46 43326.89 1188.63 73669.17293 31530.91 42138.26
1982 12023.97 -22880.69 8684.07 -26220.59 34375.74 -528.91 28844.38 -6060.28 25641.87857 -9262.78 34904.66
1983 37385.68 6718.70 40931.07 10264.09 25020.78 -5646.19 45345.63 14678.65 13760.92373 -16906.05 30666.98
1984 11424.18 -29551.70 10909.25 -30066.62 8136.11 -32839.76 27430.16 -13545.72 46059.23151 5083.356 40975.88
1985 -13159.61 -64673.53 18201.27 -33312.65 28370.98 -23142.94 7596.37 -43917.55 35880.3726 -15633.55 51513.92
1986 8920.82 -62847.37 -1659.70 -73427.90 -7535.75 -79303.94 13507.07 -58261.12 30743.92443 -41024.27 71768.19
61
Table A-2 Detrend of Per-Person Variables in Different Income Groups
1987 33145.98 -39168.54 32458.59 -39855.92 41237.94 -31076.57 48584.54 -23729.98 64976.95 -7337.57 72314.52
1988 19253.39 -50427.11 37806.28 -31874.21 40189.76 -29490.74 51422.68 -18257.82 34374.48 -35306 69680.5
1989 50335.64 -29201.34 36382.97 -43154.00 87598.29 8061.31 31469.43 -48067.55 53876.16 -25660.8 79536.98
1990 32013.25 -60590.15 34064.20 -58539.20 23304.40 -69299.00 68984.88 -23618.52 46163.87 -46439.5 92603.4
1991 7266.08 -57390.36 22763.29 -41893.14 25612.31 -39044.13 59776.83 -4879.61 47398.59 -17257.9 64656.44
1992 37039.66 -9692.53 10462.67 -36269.52 25233.82 -21498.37 -11104.54 -57836.73 28967.3 -17764.9 46732.19
1993 3628.57 -53468.64 25899.96 -31197.25 -16011.39 -73108.59 14274.47 -42822.73 -25401.5 -82498.7 57097.21
1994 12223.02 -35968.54 17275.75 -30915.80 37743.88 -10447.67 -20107.77 -68299.33 -28327.5 -76519 48191.55
1995 13153.23 -18103.08 -8545.24 -39801.55 -5640.06 -36896.37 61306.16 30049.85 48773.41 17517.1 31256.31
1996 7802.95 -44871.01 17612.54 -35061.42 13273.06 -39400.90 17787.50 -34886.46 46993.81 -5680.15 52673.96
1997 -12347.39 11568.62 4952.75 28868.76 -15260.63 8655.39 -30673.61 -6757.59 31192.72 55108.73 -23916
1998 -10153.55 7638.56 -41246.04 -23453.92 -14469.61 3322.50 -9582.58 8209.53 -94035.2 -76243.1 -17792.1
1999 12843.87 19375.22 13870.28 20401.63 -13932.79 -7401.44 -32179.12 -25647.77 41429.7 47961.05 -6531.35
2000 -34154.49 -52250.71 -9013.85 -27110.07 -15865.49 -33961.71 -25865.93 -43962.16 -33408.5 -51504.7 18096.23
2001 -31275.26 -34302.60 -10797.31 -13824.65 -28023.23 -31050.57 5355.61 2328.27 -603.058 -3630.4 3027.338
2002 8606.71 14881.60 -54529.79 -48254.89 4745.06 11019.95 -30455.17 -24180.28 -43086.3 -36811.4 -6274.89
2003 439707.73 458786.70 405519.10 424598.06 268484.64 287563.60 408942.50 428021.46 503595.5 522674.4 -19079
2004 13372.30 31011.57 -29312.26 -11672.98 -3756.45 13882.82 26737.65 44376.92 5431.588 23070.86 -17639.3
2005 45891.39 47442.70 16331.33 17882.64 41847.69 43399.00 41342.61 42893.92 111746.6 113297.9 -1551.31
2006 6053.69 -7984.90 -8775.97 -22814.56 -13172.08 -27210.68 -16708.91 -30747.51 30524.3 16485.71 14038.59
2007 -55298.72 -21337.76 22815.38 56776.34 -30896.25 3064.71 -8588.64 25372.32 -81828.4 -47867.4 -33961
2008 5660.72 107403.14 1782.73 103525.15 112350.81 214093.23 44546.71 146289.13 49590.7 151333.1 -101742
2009 74212.89 98430.40 -48791.56 -24574.04 -31692.72 -7475.21 -12903.97 11313.55 -94064.3 -69846.8 -24217.5
2010 -111276.57 -114507.37 -52506.27 -55737.06 -31792.01 -35022.81 -31772.48 -35003.28 37617.09 34386.29 3230.795
2011 77872.49 79355.51 33382.26 34865.28 32344.53 33827.55 -28745.55 -27262.53 138541.1 140024.1 -1483.02
2012 -78384.22 -76139.25 2530.57 4775.54 -12468.30 -10223.33 17320.48 19565.46 -88834.5 -86589.5 -2244.98
2013 89670.37 79201.55 77927.09 67458.27 34987.03 24518.21 37310.49 26841.67 79161.6 68692.78 10468.82
2014 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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Table A-3 Share of Total Transaction Costs on National Income
Years GNPandGDP(millions) Ad+Ser Share on GNP-GDP
1885 806 315641000 39.16141439
1886 800 315607000 39.450875
1887 818 310321000 37.93655257
1888 866 310924000 35.9034642
1889 955 329249000 34.47633508
1890 1056 382347000 36.20710227
1891 1139 375411000 32.95970149
1892 1125 394301000 35.04897778
1893 1197 407849000 34.07259816
1894 1338 469093000 35.05926756
1895 1552 514839000 33.17261598
1896 1666 546891000 32.82659064
1897 1957 670970000 34.28564129
1898 2194 780236000 35.56226071
1899 2314 740600000 32.00518583
1900 2414 889460000 36.84589892
1901 2484 896085000 36.07427536
1902 2537 963469000 37.97670477
1903 2696 998420000 37.03338279
1904 3028 1161484000 38.35812417
1905 3084 1406473000 45.6054799
1906 3302 1278210000 38.71017565
1907 3743 1323397000 35.35658563
1908 3766 1403601000 37.27033988
1909 3780 1363877000 36.08140212
1910 3925 1397900000 35.61528662
1911 4463 1557131000 34.88978266
1912 4774 1653662000 34.63891915
1913 5013 1673988000 33.39293836
1914 4738 1721958000 36.34356268
1915 4991 1729309000 34.64854739
1916 6145 2066710000 33.63238405
1917 8592 2652445000 30.87110102
1918 11839 3171346000 26.78727933
1919 15453 4522579000 29.26667314
1920 15896 4929368000 31.01011575
1921 14886 5237535000 35.18430069
1922 15573 5476882000 35.16908752
1923 14924 5553094000 37.20915304
1924 15576 5782382000 37.12366461
1925 16265 5806531000 35.69954504
1926 15975 6010060000 37.62165884
1927 16293 5918393000 36.3247591
1928 16506 6305369000 38.2004665
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Table A-3 Share of Total Transaction Costs on National Income
1929 16286 6052181000 37.16186295
1930 14698 5347872000 36.38503198
1931 12520 4752956000 37.96290735
1932 13043 5308622000 40.7009277
1933 14334 5910224000 41.23220315
1934 15672 6165265000 39.3393632
1935 16734 6131100000 36.63858014
1936 17800 6458308000 36.28262921
1937 23426 7435693000 31.74119781
1938 26793 8510237000 31.76291195
1939 33083 9948472000 30.0712511
1940 39396 11706306000 29.71445324
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Table A-4 Share of Private and Public Transactions Costs on National Income
Years Gross-Domestic-Exp (billions) Share of TotalTCs Share of PrivateTCs Share of PublicTCS 
1955 8399.1 27.74702051 20.21883297 7.528187544
1956 9446.8 28.07299826 20.926663 7.146335267
1957 10874.2 28.28070111 21.55193026 6.728770852
1958 11545.4 29.27746115 22.45049977 6.826961387
1959 13188.6 29.17519676 22.61346921 6.561727553
1960 15998 29.01612702 22.75721965 6.258907363
1961 19306.6 29.51218754 23.4526017 6.059585841
1962 21900.8 30.49842928 24.18267826 6.315751023
1963 25054.6 31.13480159 24.53800899 6.596792605
1964 29446.1 31.58482787 25.04032792 6.544499951
1965 32772.8 32.67953913 25.82904116 6.850497974
1966 38073.3 33.47148789 26.77913393 6.692353959
1967 44626.1 32.93229747 26.48315672 6.449140749
1968 52825.1 32.82587255 26.5809246 6.244947951
1969 62065.9 32.40120582 26.27449211 6.126713703
1970 73188.4 32.90179865 26.71297637 6.188822272
1971 80591.9 34.01297153 27.38947711 6.623494421
1972 92400.8 34.70002424 27.89456368 6.805460559
1973 112519.5 34.92932336 28.01301108 6.916312284
1974 133996.8 36.32071811 28.64113173 7.679586378
1975 148169.9 36.85276159 28.25668371 8.596077881
1976 166416.9 37.12639762 28.63483216 8.49156546
1977 185530.1 37.03663179 28.59115583 8.445475963
1978 204474.5 37.04789595 28.74412213 8.30377382
1979 221824.5 37.38532038 29.12446551 8.260854865
1980 240969.2 37.06183197 29.65412177 7.407710197
1981 259034 36.20941652 28.7907379 7.418678629
1982 271887.8 36.57935369 29.17159211 7.407761584
1983 282803.3 36.88217217 29.49629654 7.385875625
1984 300940.8 36.10823125 28.80107981 7.30715144
1985 323541.2 35.32672191 28.19742895 7.129292962
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Table A-4 Share of Private and Public Transactions Costs on National Income
1986 338674 35.76908768 28.62558094 7.143507
1987 352530 37.01528948 29.96150682 7.053783
1988 379250.4 36.89024455 30.04940799 6.840837
1989 408534.7 36.47565311 29.73590738 6.739746
1990 440124.8 36.20300424 29.51556013 6.687444
1991 468234.4 36.61888148 29.98431982 6.634562
1992 480492.1 37.49491407 30.74458456 6.75033
1993 484233.8 38.52174301 31.58513511 6.936608
1994 490005.2 39.62729375 32.56551155 7.061782
1995 496922.2 40.38861617 33.16841147 7.220205
1996 509983.9 40.21613231 32.95898165 7.257151
1997 520939.1 40.7392342 33.44709583 7.292138
1998 514595.2 40.75665688 33.2040019 7.552655
1999 507224.1 40.96838064 33.21074452 7.757636
2000 511462.3 40.54988999 32.7553761 7.794514
2001 505847.1 41.58145811 33.58109595 8.000362
2002 497896.8 42.37934447 34.15300118 8.226343
2003 497485 42.32256249 34.1794426 8.14312
2004 503725 41.34472182 33.16716462 8.177557
2005 503903 40.87671635 32.56678369 8.309933
2006 506687 40.65527633 32.34857022 8.306706
2007 512975 40.54875969 32.26570496 8.283055
2008 501209 40.64930997 32.11913593 8.530174
2009 471139 40.4613076 31.55692906 8.904379
2010 482384 38.88292315 30.3983963 8.484527
2011 471311 39.80386624 31.08457049 8.719296
2012 475110 39.3580434 30.80002526 8.558018
2013 480128 38.82089776 30.43750833 8.383389
2014 486939 38.44588337 29.97767688 8.468206
66
